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THE LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE-
ADDED TEACHER ASSESSMENT POLICIES 
Preston C. Green III* 
Bruce D. Baker** 
Joseph Oluwole*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years, numerous political think-tanks have 
claimed that teacher evaluation systems must be strengthened 
to prevent the granting of tenure to incompetent teachers. 1 
Several states have responded to these criticisms by requiring 
teachers to be evaluated in part based on the academic 
achievement of their students.2 Colorado, Louisiana, and 
Tennessee have required their teacher evaluation systems to be 
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1. Authors of The Widget Effect from The New Teacher Project, in a study of 
twelve districts in four states, claim that 99% of tenured teachers in districts using a 
satisfactory/unsatisfactory evaluation system received a positive rating. The same 
study claims that in districts with more ratings options, 94% of teachers still received 
the two highest rating options and less than 1% received a rating of unsatisfactory. 
DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL., THE NEW TCHR. PROJECT, THE WIDGET EFFECT: OUR 
NATIONAL FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND ACT ON DIFFERENCES IN TEACHER 
EFFECTIVENESS (2d ed. 2009), available at http://widgeteffect.org/downloads/ 
TheWidgetEffect.pdf. While the findings are striking, the study has come under fire for 
poor documentation of methods, leading to concerns that the findings are significantly 
overstated. RAYMOND L. PECHEONE & RUTH C. WEI, REVIEW OF "THE WIDGET EFFECT: 
0UH NATIONAL FAILUHE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND ACT ON TEACHER DIFFEHENCES" (2009), 
available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/TTR-Pecheonc-WIDG l~T.pdf. 
2. This trend may be the result of President Ohama's "Race to the Top Program," 
by which the Department of l~ducation provides $4.35 billion for educationally 
innovative programming. It has also encouraged states to revamp their teacher 
evaluation policies to include student achievement data. Andrew J. Rotherham, Rating 
Teachers: The Trouble with Value-Added Data, TIME, Sept. 23, 2010, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2020867,00.html. 
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based 5m1) or more on the academic growth of the students.-' At 
the time of submission of this article, only a handful of states 
had taken such bold steps. But, by the time of our final edits, 
18 states had overhauled teacher evaluation requirements with 
14 requiring that at least 40<% of teacher evaluation consist of 
student performance measures.4 While the attempts to link 
teacher evaluations to student achievement may seem 
reasonable on their face, the primary approach for doing so, 
called value-added modeling (VAM), suffers from substantial 
technical problems that may result in an alarming number of 
good teachers being falsely identified as "ineffective" and 
eventually terminated. This may be especially true in states 
adopting policies requiring 50% or more of their teacher 
evaluations to be based on student achievement scores. 
This article examines the framework and potential legal 
problems of such teacher evaluation policies. The second 
section below provides an overview of those states that have 
adopted evaluation programs that are based 50<1() or more on 
student achievement scores. The third and fourth sections 
identify some of the technical problems associated with value-
added measures and discuss how teacher evaluation plans that 
overly rely on student achievement data may be vulnerable to 
legal challenges. The final section observes that random 
teacher assignments, though problematic for removing 
discretion from school districts, are the best way to minimize 
legal and other challenges to teacher evaluation policies that 
rely 50% or more on student achievement scores. 
II. PROGRAMS IN WHICH STUDENT PERFORMANCE IS THE BASIS 
OF 50% OR MORE OF TEACHER EVALUATIONS 
Colorado, Louisiana, and Tennessee have enacted teacher 
evaluation systems requiring 50% or more of the evaluations to 
be based on students' academic growth. This section 
summarizes the evaluation systems in these states, as well as 
the procedural protections provided for teachers deemed 
ineffective. 
:l. See infra Part I I. 
4. NJ\T'L COUNCIL ON TCHIL QUALITY, STATE OF THE STATES: TilENIJS ,\Nil Ec\IlLY 
LESSONS ON TEJ\CHEI{ EVJ\LUJ\TION 1\Nll EFFEC'l'IVI•:NESS !'OLICII•:s (Oct. 2011). cwailah/e 
at http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/netq_ stateOfl'heStatl's.pdf. 
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A. Colorado 
Colorado's statute on licensed personnel evaluations in the 
area of education creates a state council for educator 
effectiveness to advise the State Board of Education. 5 A major 
goal of this council is to aid in the creation of teacher 
evaluation systems that "will ensure that every teacher is 
evaluated using multiple fair, transparent, timely, rigorous, 
and valid methods."6 Considerations of student academic 
growth must comprise at least 50% of each evaluation.7 Quality 
measures for teachers must include "measures of student 
longitudinal academic growth," such as "interim assessment 
results or evidence of student work, provided that all are 
rigorous and comparable across classrooms and aligned with 
state model content standards and performance standards."8 
These quality standards must take into account diverse factors, 
including "special education, student mobility, and classrooms 
with a student population in which ninety-five percent meet 
the definition of high-risk student."9 
Colorado's statute also calls for school districts to develop 
appeals procedures for teachers and principals found 
wanting. 10 A teacher or principal who is deemed ineffective 
must receive written notice, the documentation used for 
making this determination, and identification of the 
deficiency. 11 Furthermore, the school district must ensure that 
a tenured teacher who disagrees with this designation has "an 
opportunity to appeal that rating, in accordance with a fair and 
transparent process developed, where applicable, through 
collective bargaining." 12 If no collective bargaining agreement 
is in place, then the teacher may request a review "by a 
5. COLO. HEV. STAT.§ 22-9-105.5(2)(a) (2010). 
6. /d.§ 22-9-105.5(3)(a). 
7. !d. 
8. !d. 
9. /d. The statute also calls for the creation of performance evaluation councils 
to advise school districts. /d. § 22-9-107(1). The performance evaluation councils also 
help school districts develop teacher evaluation systems that must be based on the 
same measures as those developed by the state council for educator effectiveness. !d. § 
22-9-1 06(1 )(e)(! I). However, the performance evaluation councils lose their authority to 
set standards once the state board has promulgated rules and the initial phase of 
statewide implementation has been completed. !d.§ 22-9-106(l)(e)(l). 
10. /d.§ 22-9-106(3.5)(b)(ll). 
11. !d. § 22-9-106(3.5)(b)(l). 
12. /d. § 22-9-1 06(3.5)(b)(ll). 
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mutually agreed-upon third party." 13 The school district or 
Board for Cooperative Services must develop a remediation 
plan to correct these deficiencies to include professional 
development opportunities that are intended to help the 
teacher achieve an effective rating in her next evaluation. 14 
The teacher or principal must receive a reasonable amount of 
time to correct such deficiencies. 15 
B. Louisiana 
Louisiana's Professional Employee Quality Development 
Act requires every teacher to be evaluated annually by a local 
school board. 16 By the start of the 2012-2013 school year, 60%1 
of teacher evaluations will be based on evidence of student-
achievement growth "using a value-added assessment model as 
determined by the board for grade levels and subjects for which 
value-added data is [sicJ available." 17 Where value-added data 
are unavailable, the board will establish the growth measures. 
The model must take into account other factors, including 
students with disabilities, students eligible for free and 
reduced lunch, student attendance, and student discipline.'~ 
The board must place teachers who are found to be 
ineffective in an intensive assistance program 19 after informing 
teachers in writing of their need for intervention. 20 The 
assistance program must include at a minimum: (1) steps 
needed for the teacher to improve; (2) assistance that the board 
will provide; (3) a time line, not exceeding two years, to achieve 
the objectives; and (4) actions to be taken if the teacher fails to 
improve. 21 If the teacher fails to complete the assistance 
program in compliance with the Act, or if the teacher is deemed 
"ineffective after a formal evaluation conducted immediately 
upon completion of the program," then the board must "timely 
initiate termination proceedings."22 
1:l. !d. 
11. /d. § 22-9-1 OG(:l.5)(b)(l)-(ll). 
15. !d. 
1 G. L,\, R~:v. STAT. i\NN. § 17::l902(i\) (2010). 
17. !d. § 17::l902(B)(5). 
18. !d. 
19. !d. § 17::l902(C)(2). 
20. !d. § 17:il902(C)(2)(a). 
21. ld. § 17::3902(C)(2)(b). 
22. !d. § 17::l902(C)(2)(b)(v). 
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C. Tennessee 
Tennessee's evaluation statute, titled "Tennessee First to 
the Top Act of 2010," creates a teacher evaluation advisory 
committee to develop an annual evaluation for all teachers. 23 
The Act stipulates that 50% of the evaluation criteria must 
consist of student achievement data. Thirty-five percent (35%) 
of that percentage must be based on the Tennessee Value-
Added Assessment System (TV AAS) or a comparable test for 
student growth if no TV AAS data are available.24 The 
remaining 15%) must be mutually agreed upon by the evaluator 
and the teacher being evaluated.25 Other mandatory criteria 
for teachers include: (1) review of previous evaluations; (2) 
personal conferences, including discussion of strengths, 
weaknesses, and remediation; and (3) classroom or position 
observation followed by a written evaluation. 26 The Act also 
requires the committee to develop a local-level grievance 
procedure, which enables teachers to challenge the accuracy of 
the data used to evaluate the teacher and compliance with the 
statute's evaluation policies.27 
III. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF VALUE-ADDED MODELING28 
As noted in the prior section, three states base 50% of their 
teacher evaluation systems on student achievement data. Most 
2:l. Sec generally T~;NN. CODE ANN.§ 49-1 (2010). 
21. ld. § 19-1-Cl02(d)(2)(A)(i). 
25. Jd. § 49-1-:J02(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
26. ld. § 49-1-302(d)(2)(B). 
27. ld. § 49-1-302(d)(2). 
28. In this article, we address specifically value-added modeling, a statistical 
technique which attempts to attribute (with causal inference) student learning gains to 
teachers of record for those students. A handful of states including Colorado have 
adopted a method referred to as "student growth percentile" scores which arc a 
descriptive measure used to characterize student achievement growth including 
average student achievement growth of classes of students. These measures are not 
intended for making inferences about teacher effectiveness. See Bruce D. Baker, Take 
Your SGP and VAMit, Damn it!, SCHOOL FINANCE 101 (Sept. 2, 2011), 
http://schoolfinance 101. wordpress.com/20 11/09/02/take-your-sgp-and -vamit-damn-it/; 
Damian W. Bctehenner et a!., Student Grown Percentiles and Shoe Leather, EDUC. 
NEWS COLO. (Sept. 1:l, 2011), http://www.ednewscolorado.org/2011/09/1:3/21400-
student-[.,'Towth-percentiles-and-shoe-leather. Yet, state officials have proposed that 
these measures he used for evaluating teacher effectiveness. See Bruce D. Baker, 
Piloting the Plane on Musical Instruments & Using SGPs to Evaluate Teachers, 
SCHOOL FINANCE 101 (Sept. 22, 2011), http://schoolfinancelOl.wordpress.com/ 
2011109/22/piloting-the-plane-on-musical-instruments-using-sgps-to-evaluate-
teachers/. 
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of the VAM teacher ratings thereby generated attempt to 
predict the influence of the teacher on the student's end-of-year 
test score, given the student's prior test score and descriptive 
characteristics-for example, whether the student is poor, has 
a disability, or is limited in her English language proficiency.29 
These statistical controls are designed to account for the 
differences that teachers face in serving different student 
populations. 
There are, however, many problems associated with using 
V AM to determine whether teachers are effective. Among these 
problems are the instability of teacher ratings, classification 
and model prediction error, unreliable results from different 
"standardized" tests, difficulties in isolating a single teacher's 
contribution to students' learning, the non-random assignment 
of students across teachers, schools, and districts, and the 
struggle for teachers to even receive VAM ratings. This section 
details how these problems undermine the effectiveness of 
using VAM teacher ratings to evaluate the effectiveness of 
teachers. 
A. Instability of Teacher Ratings 
The assumption m VAM for estimating teacher 
"effectiveness" is that if one uses data on enough students 
passing through a given teacher each year, one can generate a 
stable estimate of the teacher's contribution to the students' 
29. Valm~-added ratings of Lt,achcrs are generally not based on a simplt> 
subtraction of each student's fall Lt,st score from the following spring's Lest scon' for a 
specific subject. Such an approach would clenrly disadvantage teaclwrs who happ<•n to 
serve less motivated groups of students or students with more difficult honw livt's 
and/or fewer family resourct's to support thPir academic progrPss throughout the year. 
It would be even more problt,matic to use tlw spring tPst score from tht' prior Y''ar as 
the baseline score for comparison with the spring tt~st scon• of tlw currPnt year to 
uvaluate the current teacher hecause the teacher had little control ovn any learning 
gain or loss that may have occurred during the prior summer. Additionally, tlwse gains 
and losses tend to hP different f(Jr students of higher and lower sociopconomic status. 
See Karl L. Alexanlkr et al., School8, Achieuement, and Inequality: A Seasonal 
l'erspectiue, 2:i EDUC. EVALUATION & 1'01/Y A:--IALYSIS 171 (2001). Recent findings from 
a study funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation confirm these "st~asonal" 
effects: "The norm sample results imply that students improvt' their n•ading 
compn,hension scores just as much (or mort>) betwet'n April and Octohpr as betw<'l'll 
October and April in the following grade. Scores may be rising as kids mature and gl't 
more practice outside of school." BILL & MI•:LINilA GATES FOUNil., LE,\f{:--11:--IC: ABOUT 
TEACHI:--JC: INITIAL FINlllNC:S FROM THE MI•:ASUJ{ES OF E~'FI•:<"I'IVI·: TI·:ACHINC: I'Ho.n:cT H 
(201 0), available at http://www.metproject.org/downloads/l'ndiminary Findings-
Hesearc h_l'aper. pdf. 
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achievement gains. 30 This assumption is problematic because 
of the concept of inter-temporal instability: that is, the same 
teacher is highly likely to get a very different value-added 
rating from one year to the next. The year-to-year correlation 
for a teacher's value-added rating is only about 0.2 or 0.3-at 
best a very modest correlation. Sass also notes that: 
About one quarter to one third of the teachers in the bottom 
and top quintiles stay in the same quintile from one year to 
the next while roughly 10 to 15 percent of teachers move all 
the way from the bottom quintile to the top and an equal 
proportion fall from the top quintile to the lowest quintile in 
the next year. 3 1 
Furthermore, most of the change or difference in the 
teacher's value-added rating from one year to the next is 
unexplainable-by differences in observed student 
characteristics, peer characteristics, or school characteristics. 32 
Similarly, preliminary analyses from the Measures of 
Effective Teaching Project, funded by the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, found: 
When the between-section or between-year correlation in 
teacher value-added is below .5, the implication is that more 
than half of the observed variation is due to transitory effects 
rather than stable differences between teachers. That is the 
case for all of the measures of value-added we calculated. 33 
While some statistical corrections and multi-year analysis 
might help, it is hard to guarantee or even be reasonably sure 
that a teacher would not be dismissed simply as a function of 
unexplainable low performance for two or three years in a row. 
B. Classification and Model Prediction Error 
Another technical problem of V AM teacher evaluation 
systems is classification and/or model prediction error. In a 
study funded by the U.S. Department of Education, researchers 
at Mathematica Policy Research Institute carried out a series 
:lO. TIM R. SASS, THE STABILI'I'Y OF VALUE·AilllEil M";ASURES OF n;ACHI.;R 
QUALITY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHER COMPENSATION POLICY (2008), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001266_stabilityofvalue.pdf. See also Daniel F. 
McCaffrey et a!., The Intertemporal Variability of Teacher Effect Estimates, 4 Enuc. 
FIN. & POI;Y 572 (2009). 
ill. SASS, supra note ilO, at 2. 
il2. ld. 
:3:3. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 29, at 19. 
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of statistical tests and reviews of existing studies to determine 
the identification "error" rates for ineffective teachers when 
using typical value-added modeling methods. 34 The report 
found: 
Type I and II error rates for comparing a teacher's 
performance to the average are likely to be about 25 percent 
with three years of data and 35 percent with one year of data. 
Corresponding error rates for overall false positive and 
negative errors are 10 and 20 percent, respectively. 35 
Type I error refers to the probability that based on a certain 
number of years of data, the model will find that a truly 
average teacher performed significantly worse than averageY' 
Thus, there is about a 25% chance if using three years of data 
or a 35% chance if using one year of data that a teacher who is 
"average" would be identified as "significantly worse than 
average" and potentially be fired. Of particular concern is the 
likelihood that a "good teacher" is falsely identified as a "bad" 
teacher-in this case a "false positive" identification. According 
to the study, this occurs one in ten times given three years of 
data and two in ten times given only one year of dataY 
C. Same Teachers, Different Tests, Different Results 
Determining whether a teacher is effective may vary 
depending on the assessment used for a specific subject area 
and not whether that teacher is a generally effective teacher in 
that subject area. For example, Houston uses two standardized 
tests each year to measure student achievement: the state 
Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) and the 
national Stanford Achievement Test. 3 ~ NYU Professor Sean 
Corcoran and colleagues used Houston Independent School 
District (HISD) data from each test to calculate separate value-
added measures for fourth- and fifth-grade teachers. 39 The 
:l!l. PI,TEH Z. SCHOCH I•:'!' & HANLEY S. CHIAN<:, U.S. DI•:I''T ElllW., EIUlOI( IlATES IN 
MK\SUIUNC: Tl·:i\CHEI( ,\Nil SCHOOL l'l•:llFORMi\NCE Bi\SIW ON STUDENT TI•:ST SCOil!o: 
GAINS (.July. 201 0), cwailable at http:!/iPs.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/201 O!IO(H/pdt/201 ()I[()(H.pdf. 
:l5. /d. at i. 
:36. !d. at 12. 
:l7. /d. at i. 
:l8. SK\N 1'. CORCOIL\'l ET i\L., AN'li•:NBim<: INS'I'ITUTI·: FOR SCHOOL i{EFOill\1, C.\K 
T~:ACHEilS BE EVi\LUi\'n:D BY THEIR STU!lE:--JTS' TI·:ST Sco1n:s'! SHOULD 'I'HI•:Y BE'' THE 
USE OF Vi\LUJo:-AilllEIJ MEASURES OF '!'I•:ACH Jo:l( EFFEC'I'IVEKESS IN I'OLICY ,\Nil I'IL\CTICI•: 
1:3 (201 0), available at http://annenlwrginstitute.org/pclf/valueaddedreport.pdf. 
:l!1. See /d. at 17. 
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authors found that a teacher's value-added rating can vary 
considerably depending on which test is used.40 Specifically: 
[A]mong those who ranked in the top category (5) on the 
TAKS reading test, more than 17 percent ranked among the 
lowest two categories on the Stanford test. Similarly, more 
than 15 percent of the lowest value-added teachers on the 
TAKS were in the highest two categories on the Stanford.41 
Recent findings from the Bill and Melinda Gates' 
Foundation's Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) project 
were quite similar to those of Corcoran.42 While the MET 
report authors downplayed low correlations between teacher 
ratings generated by different tests, independent reviewer, 
University of California at Berkeley economist Jesse Rothstein 
explained: 
The study finds that the measures are related, but only 
modestly. The report interprets this as support for the use of 
value-added as the basis for teacher evaluations. This 
conclusion is unsupported, as the data in fact indicate that a 
teachers' [sic] value-added for the state test is not strongly 
related to her effectiveness in a broader sense. Most notably, 
value-added for state assessments is correlated 0.5 or less 
with that for the alternative assessments, meaning that many 
teachers whose value-added for one test is low are in fact 
quite effective when judged by the other.43 
Similar issues apply to tests on different scales: different 
possible ranges of scores or different statistical modification or 
treatment of raw scores-for example, whether student test 
scores are first converted into standardized scores relative to 
an average score or expressed on some other scale such as 
percentile rank (which is done in some cases but would 
generally be considered inappropriate). For instance, if a 
teacher is typically assigned higher performing students and 
the scaling of a test is such that it becomes very difficult for 
students with high starting scores to improve over time, that 
teacher will be at a disadvantage. However, another test of the 
10. !d. 
11. !d. 
42. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., WORKING WITH TEACHERS TO DEVELOP FAIR 
AND i{ELIABLE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVE TEACHING (June 2010), available at 
http://www.metproject.org/downloads/met-framing-paper.pdf. 
43. JESSE i{OTHSTEIN, REVIEW OF LRARNTNG ABOUT TEAClllNG 1 (Jan. 2011), 
available at http:/ /nepc.colorado.ed u/files/TTR-MET-Hothstein. pdf. 
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same content or another test with a different scaling of scores 
(so that smaller gains are adjusted to reflect the relative 
difficulty of achieving those gains) may produce an entirely 
different rating for that teacher. 
D. Difficulty in Isolating Any One Teacher's Influence on 
Student Achievement 
It is difficult, if not entirely infeasible, to isolate one specific 
teacher's contribution to students' learning, leading to 
situations where a teacher might be identified as a bad teacher 
simply because her colleagues are ineffective. This is called the 
spillover effect.44 For students who have more than one teacher 
across subjects (and/or teaching aides/assistants), each 
teacher's value-added measures may be influenced by the other 
teachers serving the same students. Northwestern University 
Professor Kirabo ,Jackson and researcher Elias Bruegmann, for 
example, found in a study of North Carolina teachers that 
students perform better, on average, when their teachers have 
more effective colleagues.45 University of Missouri Professor 
Cory Koedel found that reading achievement in high school is 
influenced by both English and math teachers. 46 These 
spillover effects mean that teachers assigned to weaker teams 
of teachers might be disadvantaged through no fault of their 
own. 
E. Non-Random Assignment of Students Across Teachers, 
Schools, and Districts 
The fact that teacher value-added ratings cannot fully be 
disentangled from patterns of student assignment across 
schools and districts leads to the likelihood that teachers 
serving larger shares of one population versus another are 
more likely to be identified as effective or ineffective through 
no fault of their own. This non-random assignment problem 
relates not to the error in the measurement of test scores, but 
to the complications of applying a statistical model to real-
·11. Cory Koedcl, An l~mpirical Analysis of Teacher Spillmwr J~ffccts in Secondary 
School. 2H EcoN. I~IlUC. J{~;v. f:i82 (2009). 
45. C. Kiraho .Jackson & Elias Bruegmann, Tcachinu Students and Tmchinu 
l~ach Other: The Importance of l'Per Learninu for Teachers, 1 AM. ECON. ,J.: AI'I'LIE!l 
ECON. i'\5 (2009). 
4f:i. KoedPI, supra note 11, at 691. 
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world conditions. The fairest comparisons between teachers 
would occur in a case where teachers were randomly assigned 
to comparable classrooms with comparable resources and 
where exactly the same number of students were randomly 
assigned to those teachers. Teachers would then have the same 
number of children with similar family backgrounds, prior 
performance, personal motivation, and other characteristics. 
Such circumstances, however, are unrealistic. Students are 
not sorted randomly across schools, districts, or teachers within 
schools. Nor are teachers randomly assigned across school 
settings with equal resources. Instead, it is likely that one 
fourth-grade teacher in a school is assigned more difficult 
students year after year than another. This may occur by 
choice of that teacher, having a desire to try to help such 
students, or by other factors, such as the desire of a principal to 
make a teacher's work more difficult. While most value-added 
models contain some crude indicators of poverty status, 
language proficiency, and disability classification, few, if any, 
sufficiently mitigate the bias that occurs as a result of non-
random student assignment. Bias stems from such apparently 
subtle forces as the influence of peers on one another and the 
inability of value-added models to sufficiently isolate the 
teacher effect from the peer effect, both of which occur in the 
classroom.47 In fact, University of California, Berkeley 
Professor Jesse Rothstein notes that "[r]esults indicate that 
even the best feasible value added models may be substantially 
biased, with the magnitude of the bias depending on the 
amount of information available for use m classroom 
assignments."4g 
17. Th(,re exist at least two different approaches to control peer group 
composition. One approach involves constructing measures of the average Pntry level of 
performance for all other students in the class. Caroline M. Hoxby & Gretchen 
Wcingarth, Malcolm Wiener Inequality & Social Policy Seminar Series, Taking Race 
Out of the Equation: School Reassignment and the Structure of Peer Effects (Mar. 20, 
2006). available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/inequality/Seminar/Papers/ 
Hoxby06.pdf. Another involves constructing measures of the average racial and 
socioeconomic characteristics of classmates. Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin, 
School Quality and the Blach- White Achievement Gap (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12651, 2006), available at http://faculty.smu.edu/millimet/ 
classes/eco7:321/papers/hanushek%,20rivkin%2002.pdf. 
18. Jesse Rothstein, Student Sorting and Bias in Value Added Estimation: 
Selection on Observables and Unobservables (Nat'! Bureau of !~con. Research, Working 
Paper No. 11666, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/ w14666.pdf? 
new_ window=]. See also .Jesse \{othstein, Teacher Quality in Educational Production: 
Traching, Decay, and Student Achievement, 125 Q.J. ECON. 175 (2010). Many advocates 
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Value-added modeling has more recently been at the center 
of public debate after the Los Angeles Times contracted RAND 
Corporation economist Richard Buddin to estimate value-added 
scores for Los Angeles teachers, 49 and the Times reporters then 
posted the names of individual teachers classified as effective 
or ineffective on their web site. 50 The fairly typical model used 
by Buddin produced technical documentation rich with 
evidence of the types of model bias described by Rothstein and 
others. 51 For example: 
• Ninety-seven percent of 
performing schools and 
schools are poor; 
children in the lowest 
55%> m higher performing 
• The number of gifted children 
teacher's value-added estimate 
gifted children, the higher the 
rating; 
m a class affects the 
positively; -the more 
teacher's effectiveness 
• Black teachers have lower value-added scores for both 
English Language Arts and math than white teachers; 
• Having more black students in a class is negatively, 
albeit minimally, associated with teacher's value-added 
scores; 
• Asian teachers have higher value-added scores than 
white teachers for Math, with a positive association 
of value-added approaches point to a piece by Thomas Kane and Douglas Staiger as 
downplaying l{othstein's concerns. Thomas .J. Kam: & Douglas 0. Staiger·. J.;,,timating 
Teczcher impacts on Student Achi!'u!'ment: An Hxperimental gualuation (Nat'! Bun•au of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11607, 200/'l), auailable at http://www.nher.ot'g/ 
papers/w11607.pdf/new_window=l. However, wit.h n:gard to tlw Karw and Staiger 
analysis, Eric Hanushek and SteVl:n l{ivkin explain: "the possiblt: uniqtwness of t.lw 
sample and the limitations of tht: specification test suggest can: in interpn•t.ation of tlw 
results." Eric A. Hanushek & Stevt:n G. Rivkin, Presentation for the Anwrican 
Economic Association, Genaalizations about Using Valu.e-Add<'d Measure's of' Teuch<'r 
Quality 7 (.Jan. :l-5, 201 0), uuailahle at http://www.utdallas.edu/n:search/tsp-
erc/pdt/jrnl_hanushek_rivkin_201 0_ teacher_quality.pdf. 
19. Richard Buddin, How gllectiue Are Los Angeles J,;zementary 'fhu·hers and 
Schools( (MI'RA Paper No. 27:lnG, Aug. :ll. 2010), available at http:l/mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/27:-l()()/1 /M I']{A_paper _27:l66. pdf. 
50. See, e.g., L.A. Tchr. Ratings, L.A. TIMES, http://projects.latinws.com/value-
added/ (last visited .Jan. 19, 2012). 
G 1. See generally Buddin. supra note 19. Derek Briggs and B(•n Domingm• of the 
University of Colorado conductt•d re-analysis of the L.A. Times data, showing t.hat with 
modest model improvements (over the original Buddin model), some of the bias could 
be removed. See DEilEK !lRJ(:t:s & BJ•;N DOMINt:LJE, NA'r'L EllUC. J'OJ,'y CJ·;NTEJ{, DUJ·; 
DILIGI<;NCE ANIJ THE EVALUATION CW Ti<:ACHIWS: A REVIEW OF THE V,\LUE-Aillllm 
ANALYSIS lJN!lEHLYINC: THE EFFJ<:CTIV";N,;ss RANKINUS OF LOS ANW:LI•:S U:-.JIFIJ<:Il 
SCHOOL DISTRICT TEACHimS IW THE LOS ANUF:UcS 'f'!Mfo.'S (Feb. 2011). tWClilab/e at 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/N !~PC-RB-I ,AT-V AM_O. pdf. 
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between Asian race and math-teaching effectiveness 
being as strong as the negative association for black 
teachers.52 
Some of these associations above are explained by related 
research by Stanford University Senior Fellow Eric Hanushek 
and Amherst College Professor Steven Rivkin, which shows 
measurable effects of the racial composition of peer groups on 
individual students' outcomes and explains the difficulty in 
distilling these peer effects from teacher effects. 53 Note that it 
is also likely that the above findings associated with teacher 
race are entangled with student race, so that black teachers are 
more likely to be in classrooms with larger shares of black 
students. 54 
All value-added comparisons are relative. They can be used 
for comparing one teacher to another in a school, teachers in 
one school to teachers in another school, or teachers in one 
district to those within other districts. The reference group 
becomes critically important when determining the potential 
for disparate impact of negative teacher ratings resulting from 
model bias. For example, employing a district-wide 
performance-based dismissal (or retention) policy in Los 
Angeles using Buddin's model would likely result in 
disproportionate layoffs of teachers in poor schools and black 
teachers of black students, while disproportionately retaining 
Asian teachers.55 However, if one adopted the layoff policy 
relative to within-school rather than district-wide norms, 
because children are largely segregated racially and 
economically by neighborhoods and schools, the disparate effect 
might be lessened. The policy may neither be fairer nor better 
in terms of educational improvement, but racially disparate 
dismissals might be reduced. 
Finally, because teacher value-added ratings cannot be 
disentangled entirely from patterns of student assignment 
across teachers within schools, principals may manipulate 
assignment of difficult and/or unmotivated students in order to 
compromise a teacher's value-added ratings, increasing the 
principal's ability to dismiss that teacher. This concern might 
52. Jd. 6, 7, 12, 16, and 14, respectively. 
53. Hanushek & Rivkin, supra note 47. 
51. Charles T. Clotfelter et a!., Who Teaches Whom? Race and the Distribution of 
Nouice Teachers, 24 ECON. EDUC. REV. 377 (2005). 
55. See Buddin, supra note 19, at 12-16. 
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be mitigated by requirements for lottery-based student and 
teacher assignments. However, such requirements could create 
cumbersome student assignment processes that interfere with 
achieving the best teacher match for each child. 
Whereas the problem of stability and error rates above arc 
issues of "statistical error," the problem of non-random 
assignment is one of "model bias." Many value-added ratings of 
teacher effectiveness suffer from both large degrees of error 
and severe levels of model bias. The two are cumulative, not 
overlapping, problems. In fact, the extent of error in the 
measures may partially mask the full extent of bias. 
F. Reduced Ability for Teachers to Receive VAM Ratings 
In addition to the substantial concerns regarding 
"measurement error" and "model bias," which severely 
compromise the reliability and validity of value-added ratings 
of teachers as outlined above, in most public school districts, 
far fewer than half of certified teaching staff could even be 
assigned any type of value-added assessment score. While some 
reports suggest that as many as 30<% might be assigned value 
added scores, when data demands are increased for applying 
more rigorous models, requiring more lagged student scores, 
thus reducing grade levels evaluated, these figures may drop 
significantly.56 Existing standardized assessments typically 
focus on reading or language arts and math performance 
between grades three and eight. 57 Also, because baseline scores 
are required-ideally multiple prior scores to limit model 
bias-it becomes difficult to fairly rate third grade teachers.5x 
By middle school or junior high, students are interacting with 
many more teachers, and it becomes more difficult to assign 
value-added scores to any one teacher. 59 When considering the 
56. See, e.g., CYNTHIA D. l'liiNCI•: ET /\L., CENTEI{ FOil EIJLJ('. CO~II'ENS,\TION 
I{EI•'OHM, 'I'HI·: O'I'Him 69 P1mc1•:NT: F,\lllLY Rl·:wMWIN<: THE I'EI{FOil\1:\Ncl·: oF 
TI·:ACIIEilS OF NONTI•:STEIJ SUil.JECTS /\Nil GI\/\IJES (Aug. 2009). cwai/oble ot 
http://cccr.ed.gov/guides/othcr69Pcrcent.pdf; COIWOI\i\N ET .\L .• 8llpra note :J/l. Briggs 
and Domingue's re-analysis of data from the L.A. '!'imPs study explains that c•ven 
among th<• broad catPgory of ratable tpachl'rs, only a relatively small sharp could 
actually lw assigned ratings through mon• data rich mmkls. See BlliC:< :s & DOIVIIN<: U E. 
supra note 51. at 22. 
57. EVA L. BAKI.;Ji I•:T AL., ECON. I'OL'Y INST, l'lmllLI•:rvts WITH THE USJ•: OF STlllli·:NT 
'l'J.:ST SC(}J(ES TO EV.\LUATI·: 'I'EACHI.;J/S !() (Aug. 29, 2010). rwailab/e at 
http://epi.:kdn.net/721cd9a 1 ch91 dOff() hwm6iij90.pdf. 
58. SCHOCH ET & CHL\N<:. supra not<> :31, at 20. 
59. See Koedel, 8upra note ·11. at 682. 
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various support staff roles, specialist teachers, and teachers of 
elective and/or advanced secondary courses, value-added 
measures are generally applicable to only a small minority of 
teachers in any school district (less than 30%).60 Thus, in order 
to make value-added measures a defined element of teacher 
evaluation in teacher contracts, one must have separately 
negotiated contracts for those teachers to whom these 
measures apply. Unfortunately, this is administratively 
cumbersome and potentially expensive for districts, especially 
in such difficult economic times. 
Washington DC's IMPACT teacher evaluation system is one 
example that differentiates classes of teachers based on 
evaluation by including or excluding value-added measures.61 
While contractually feasible, this approach creates separate 
classes of teachers in schools and may have unintended 
consequences for educational practices, including increased 
tensions between non-value-added-rated teachers wishing to 
pull students of value-added-rated teachers out of class for 
special projects or activities. 
IV. POSSIBLE LEGAL CHALLENGES BY TERMINATED TENURED 
TEACHERS 
The previous section identified a number of technical issues 
that limit the effectiveness of V AM teacher evaluation plans. 
These technical problems make V AM teacher evaluation plans 
vulnerable to legal challenges by terminated tenured 
teachers.62 Teachers may bring challenges pursuant to the Due 
60. BAKER ET AL., supra note 57, at 12. 
61. See generally, IMPACT GUlllEBOOKS, D.C. PUB. SCHS. (2011), available at 
http://dcps.dc.gov/DCI'S/ln+the+Classroom/Ensuring+Teacher+Success/IMPACT+(l'erf 
ormance+Assessment)/IMI'ACT+Guidebooks. 
62. Teachers who have been transferred from a non-VAM grade to a VAM grade 
might consider challenging the transfer. It is unlikely for these legal challenges to be 
successful, however. If the tt)acher is transferred to a grade in which she is certified, 
then she cannot make a challenge on Due Process Clause grounds. As the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in Smith v. Sch. Dist. of Darby, 130 A.2d 661, 
665 (I' a. 1957): "A professional employee, under the tenure provisions of the Code, does 
not acquire a vested right to teach in any certain class or in any certain school. The 
only limitation on a school board's general power is that the work to which a 
professional employee is assigned be of a rank or class equivalent to that by which his 
permanent status was acquired and one for which he is qualified." (internal citations 
omitted). A teacher transferred from a non-VAM grade to a VAM grade might claim 
that the transfer constitutes a demotion in violation of a teacher tenure statute. See, 
e.g .. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1151 (1963) ("there shall be no demotion of any 
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Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Title VII. The 
remainder of this section elaborates on these options. 
A. The Due Process Clause 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law."63 The Due Process 
Clause applies if the court determines that the plaintiffs have 
been deprived of a life, liberty, or property interest, whether 
procedurally or substantively. Procedural due process "(often 
summarized as 'notice and an opportunity to be heard'), is a 
right to a fair procedure or set of procedures before one can be 
deprived of property by the state."64 Substantive due process 
"imposes limits on what a state may do regardless of what 
procedural protection is provided."65 
1. Protected interest 
To bring a Due Process Clause challenge, plaintiffs must 
first show that the government has infringed upon a life, 
liberty, or property interest. Plaintiffs may contend that a 
teacher evaluation system that relies significantly on student 
achievement data deprives them of a liberty interest. 
Deprivation of a liberty interest imposes a "stigma or other 
disability" that damages a person's standing in the community 
or forecloses a person's "freedom to take advantage of other 
employment opportunities."66 On the other hand, "[a] 
statement that is basically one alleging conduct that fails to 
meet professional standards . . . does not impinge upon a 
liberty interest."67 
professional employe [sic] either in salary or in type of position ... without the consent 
of the l'mploye [sic], or, if such consent is not received, thpn such dpmotion shall he 
subjPct to the right to a hearing hefon' ttw board of school dir'('(;tors and an ap]wal"). 
Howevr,r. a court is unlikdy to vit'W such a transfer as a "rkmotion" hr•cause tht•n• is no 
loss in scdary or status. Sec Appeal of Santee, 156 A2d tno (Pa. 19!}\l) (finding that a 
transfer from a secondary grade to an ekmentary grade was not a dPmotion ])('caust• 
there was no difference in salary or prestige). 
G:l. U.S. Co:-.JS'I'. amend. XIV.~ 1. 
()·1. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.:ld 5()7, 571 (Gth Cir. 2000). 
65. Fournier v. Reardon, 1GO F.:ld 7G1. 757 (1st Cir. 1998). For more on the lhw 
Process Clause. sec Corinna B. Lain, The Unexceptionulism of "l~uoluing Standards." 57 
UCLA L. REV. :165 (2009). 
66. Bd. of Regents of State Colis. v. Roth, ·108 U.S. 5()<1, 57:l (1972). 
67. Raposa v. Mead Sch. Dist. •H1-l, 790 F.2d 1:119, 1:l51 (Sth Cir. HlSf)) (holding 
that school district's finding that teacher did not, inter alia, coo1wrate with otlwr 
1] VALUE-ADDED TEACHER ASSESSMENT POLICIES 17 
It is doubtful that teachers terminated on the basis of their 
students' performance on achievement tests can establish a 
liberty interest. St. Louis Teachers Union, Local 420 v. Board 
of Education of St. Louis68 supports this assertion. In this case, 
the St. Louis, Missouri school district adopted an evaluation 
system that called for certain teachers to be evaluated based on 
the California Achievement Test (CAT). 69 Plaintiffs who had 
received a preliminary score of "unsatisfactory" asserted that 
this rating violated their liberty interest.70 The district court 
found that the school district's finding of "unsatisfactory" did 
not implicate a liberty interest because the district merely 
declared that the plaintiffs "did not meet professional 
standards for that year."71 Such a finding did not damage the 
ability of the teachers to find employment elsewhere.72 
Plaintiffs terminated on the basis of student performance 
might be able to establish a property interest, however. 
Property interests "are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law."73 In Cleveland Board of 
Education v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court found that 
tenured teachers had a property right to continued 
employment derived from the state tenure statute. 74 
2. Procedural due process 
If plaintiffs can establish a protectable due process right, 
they might argue that a teacher evaluation policy that relies 
50% or more on standardized tests, for example, violates 
procedural due process. Procedural due process is a flexible 
concept in that the procedural protections afforded to 
individuals depend on the demands of the particular situation. 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court found that the 
level of procedural due process depends on three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
teachers or failed to teach required subjects did not impinge upon a liberty interest). 
68. 652 F. Supp. 425 (E. D. Mo. 1987). 
G9. Jd. at 127. 
70. ld. at 4:l2. 
71. !d. 
72. /d. 
7:3. Bel. of Regents of State Colis. v. Roth, 108 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
71. 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985). 
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interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government's interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 75 
With respect to the first factor, courts have consistently 
held that teachers have a considerable private interest in 
retaining employment. 76 With regards to the second factor, the 
risk of erroneous deprivation under value-added assessments is 
quite substantial; there is a 26%1 chance if a school district uses 
three years of data and a 35%J chance if using one year of data 
that a teacher who is average would be identified as 
significantly worse than average and potentially fired. To base 
50% or more of a teacher evaluation on such a flawed 
mechanism is therefore quite troubling. 
The plaintiffs could argue that the governmental interest in 
hiring effective teachers docs not outweigh these interests. It is 
unclear how the consideration of other quality measures such 
as "interim assessments results or evidence of student work"77 
will sufficiently mitigate the problem of overreliance on value-
added assessments. Moreover, as to fiscal concerns, "[i]t is 
preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a new 
one."7X Furthermore, "the employer shares the employee's 
interest in avoiding disruption and erroneous decisions,"79 and 
it is quite possible that a termination process with such a high 
error rate might have a negative impact on the recruitment of 
qualified teachers. 
3. Substantive due process 
Plaintiffs might also claim that a teacher evaluation system 
that is based 50%) or more on student achievement violates 
substantive due process. Substantive due process imposes 
limits on what a state may do regardless of what procedural 
75. 121 U.S. :n 9, :l:l5 (1976). 
76. Louderrni/1, 170 U.S. at 51:1; Wash. TPachem' Union Local No. 6 v. Bd. of 
Educ. of D.C., 109 F.:ld 77-1, 71-10 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Tex. FaculL~· 1\ss'n v. Univ. of TPx. at 
Dall., 916 F.2d :l79, :li-11 (f>th Cir. 1991). 
77. CoLO. HEV. STAT. § 22-9-1 05.5(:l)(a) (201 0). 
78. Lou.dcrmill, •170 U.S. at :111 (finding that terminatPd tc•achPrs an• Pntit!Pd to a 
pn,-termination hearing). 
7~). /d. 
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protection is provided. A substantive due process analysis then 
requires that courts determine if the "life, liberty or property" 
interest in question is a fundamental right~W-a right explicit 
or implicit in the federal constitution. 81 If a fundamental right 
is involved, the court reviews the legislative act using the strict 
scrutiny standard of review. 82 Under this standard of review, 
the burden is on the government to show that the legislative 
act is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental 
interest. 83 
If a fundamental right is not involved, the court reviews the 
legislative act under the more lenient rational basis standard 
of review. Under this standard, a violation of substantive due 
process occurs only if the legislative act is not rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest.84 When an executive action or a 
specific act of a government official is challenged, substantive 
due process analysis requires courts to determine only if the 
executive action "shocks the conscience."85 
If a tenured teacher is terminated due to the performance of 
her students on tests, then a rational basis analysis would be 
used because the termination occurred pursuant to a legislative 
act and a fundamental right is not implicated. 86 It is critical to 
point out that while plaintiffs have the burden of proof under 
rational basis review, the state could lose its case if its actions 
are arbitrary or irrational. 87 Plaintiffs in states where teacher 
HO. Dunn v. Fairfield Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 225, 158 F.:id 962, 965 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
81. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
82. /d. 
H:i. ]{oe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (197:3), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 121 (2007). 
81. FCC v. Beach Commc'n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 311 n.6 (1993). 
1-\5. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 816-47 (1998). 
86. No reported cases have addressed the question of whether tenured teachers 
can be terminated based on student achievement scores pursuant to substantive due 
process. Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Cent. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 188 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 197:3) 
(overturning lower court's finding that termination of teachers was arbitrary because 
the tl'acher was untenured at the end of her contract); St. Louis Teachers Union, Local 
120 v. Bd. of Educ. of St. Louis, 652 F. Supp. 425 (E. D. Mo. 1987) (finding that tenured 
teachers stated a cause of action challenging salary decisions of certain teachers on the 
basis of student achievement test scores). lt is critical to note that the Supreme Court 
has rull>d that education is not a fundamental right. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1. 
87. See, e.g., Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of N.Y. C., :350 U.S. 551, 556 (1956) 
(quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 311 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) ("constitutional protection 
does extend to the public servant whose exclusion [from public employment] pursuant 
to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory"); Roth, 108 U.S. at 581 (quoting 
Slodwwer, :!50 U.S. at 559) ("[Tjhe 'protection of the individual against arbitrary 
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evaluations are based 50<% or more on value-added assessments 
might be able to make a tenable case for irrationality. As 
discussed, there is a 10%) to 20<% chance that a "good" teacher 
will be falsely identified as a "bad" teacher. xx There are 
significant error rates, too: 25%) with three years of data and 
35% with one year of data. A court might find that the error 
rates are so extreme as to not be rationally related to any 
legitimate interest. 
The high-stakes student testing case Debra P. u. 
Turlington'!~.'> provides further support for a possible finding of 
irrationality. In Debra P., Florida students challenged the 
constitutional validity of a state requirement that as a 
condition precedent to obtaining high school diplomas, students 
must pass a state test. 90 The students contended that such usc 
of the test violated their due process rights. The United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida agreed, holding 
that the use of the test violated the students' due process 
property rights to a diploma due to a lack of adequate notice. 91 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
remanded the case for further findings as to whether the high-
stakes test "was a fair test of that which is taught in [Florida's] 
classrooms."92 The circuit court stated that if the test covered 
content not actually taught in the state's classrooms, the test 
would violate substantive due proccss,93 opining that "the state 
is obligated [under substantive due process] to avoid action 
which is arbitrary and capricious, does not achieve or even 
frustrates a legitimate state interest, or is fundamentally 
unfair."94 The court went on to conclude that the high-stakes 
test may have violated substantive due process "in that it may 
have covered matters not taught in the schools of the state."95 
The record was "simply insufficient in proof that the test 
administered measures what was actually taught in the schools 
action' ... [isj tlw very t•ssenct• of dul' procpss"): id. at S77 (protl•ct<•d pnlpc>rt:'i rights 
cannot lw ''arbitrarily nndl'rmincd."). 
SS. SC'IIOCHET & CHIANG, supra nok :H, at 12. See supra Part Ill. B. 
S9. 171 F. Supp. 2,1,1 (M.D. Fla. 197~1), aff'd, 6,11 F.2d :m7 (Gth Cir. 19Sl). 
90. !d. 
(Jl. Debra 1'. v. Turlington, 6'1'1 1•'.2d :l97, '102 (5th Cir. 191-11). 
92. !d. at 'lOR 
9:l. !d. at '!0'1. 
91. ld. 
95. !d. at 106. 
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of Florida."96 
On remand, the district court found that the high-stakes 
test was instructionally valid and was therefore permissible 
under substantive due process. The circuit court affirmed the 
decision.97 It rejected the notion that the state had to 
demonstrate that the test covered materials actually taught in 
the classroom because there were no accepted standards for 
deciding whether a test was instructionally valid, 9g concluding 
instead that there was adequate evidence of its being 
instructionally valid. 99 Among other things, the court was 
impressed by the state's efforts to provide remedial instruction 
to students who needed extra help mastering the skills on the 
test, 100 as well as by a student survey finding that 90 to 95% of 
the students believed that they had been taught the test 
skills. 101 
If a court were to adopt the Debra P. approach, it might 
determine that a teacher evaluation program based 50% or 
more on a value-added assessment, having a significant 25% 
error rate with three years of data and 35% error rate with one 
year of data, violates substantive due process. The crucial 
question would be whether it is fundamentally unfair to base 
the decision to terminate a teacher on an assessment with such 
high error rates. The circuit court in Debra P. found 
fundamental fairness only because the state of Florida 
provided remediation for those students who failed the 
examination. 102 
Yet there is an important distinction between the high-
stakes test analyzed in Debra P. and the teacher evaluation 
programs analyzed in this Article. In Debra P., the Fifth 
Circuit found that there were "no accepted educational 
standards for determining" what constitutes instructional 
validity103 and so the state's task in establishing the validity of 
the high-stakes test was made relatively easy. By contrast, the 
Economic Policy Institute states that "there is broad agreement 
96. !d. 
97. Dehra 1'. v. Turlington, 7:i0 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th Cir. 1984). 
98. Jd. at 1109. 
99. !d. at 1 ;J 11. 
100. Jd. 
101. !d. 
102. !d. at 1111, 1116. 
IO:l. Jd. at l!J 12 n.4. 
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among statisticians, psychometricians, and economists that 
student test scores alone are not sufficiently reliable and valid 
indicators of teacher effectiveness to be used in high-stakes 
personnel decisions, even when the most sophisticated 
statistical applications such as value-added modeling are 
employed," 104 making it more difficult for VAM to receive court 
approval. 
Because of this consensus, a court may find that sole 
reliance on a value-added assessment model would be 
fundamentally unfair. Thus, the question the court may decide 
to address under Debra P. is whether the other measurements 
and remedial policies sufficiently counter the value-added-
assessment system's inherent irrationality. All of the state 
policies analyzed in this Article rely on remediation of teachers 
who are deemed ineffective. However, as explained, it may be 
more difficult to provide remediation for teachers whose 
students fail to meet achievement benchmarks. A teacher could 
do a wonderful job but not see academic gains because of the 
socioeconomic, racial, and ability composition of her class. In 
other words, remediation may be less effective because of 
factors completely out of control of the teacher. Additionally, a 
teacher who is indeed effective, yet forced to undergo 
remediation due to a false identification based on the VAM, 
might face consequent stigma. 
B. The Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause provides in pertinent part: "No 
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." 105 It "docs not forbid 
classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers 
from treating differently persons who are in all relevant 
respects alike." 106 
Courts generally use three levels of analysis for Equal 
Protection Clause challenges. Governmental classifications 
that implicate a fundamental right or target a suspect class arc 
subject to strict scrutiny, which requires a narrow tailoring to 
satisfy a compelling governmental interest. Quasi-suspect 
classifications such as gender and illegitimacy are subject to 
10,1. BAKEl( 1•:'1' AL., supra notl' ii7, at 2. 
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.~ I. 
1 Ofi. Nordlingl'r v. Hahn, 50!) U.S. 1. 10 (1992). 
1] VALUE-ADDED TEACHER ASSESSMENT POLICIES 23 
intermediate scrutiny, requiring substantial relation to an 
important governmental interest. All other classifications are 
subject to a rational basis analysis, meaning that they will be 
constitutional as long as they are rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest. 107 
Courts reviewing equal protection claims of tenured 
teachers terminated because of their students' academic 
performance will probably use a rational basis analysis 
because: (1) no fundamental right is implicated; and (2) 
terminated tenured teachers are not a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class. In Debra P., the circuit court held that a high-stakes 
student test that fails to cover the material within the 
curriculum could not be rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest. In other words, "[i]f the test is not fair, 
it cannot be said to be rationally related to a state interest." 108 
It might be possible that the error rates of value-added 
estimates might make teacher evaluation policies that are 50% 
or more reliant on such tests "too unfair" or arbitrary to satisfy 
the rational basis test, similar to the discussion under the Due 
Process Clause. 
C. Title VII 
The third section of this Article presented research 
indicating that: (1) black students tend to fare worse on 
standardized tests than white students; and (2) black teachers 
are more likely to work in schools of low-income black 
students. 109 Thus, it follows that black teachers are more likely 
to be dismissed on the basis of poor value-added test scores. 
This is especially true if states adopt teacher evaluation 
systems that rely 50% or more on student standardized test 
scores. 
The potential racial impact of such systems may make them 
vulnerable to challenges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, which makes it unlawful for an employer "to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race." 110 There are two types of 
107. !d. 
108. Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d :397, 406 (5th Cir. 1981). 
109. See supra Part III.K 
110. 12 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2010). 
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Title VII challenges: (1) disparate treatment, which deals with 
purposeful discrimination; and (2) disparate impact, which 
addresses employment policies that are "fair in form but 
discriminatory in operation." 111 While no doubt disparate 
treatment cases may occur, it is much more likely that teacher 
evaluation policies will be enacted without any provable racial 
animus. For this reason, this Article analyzes racial effects 
under a disparate impact analysis. 112 
Courts apply a three-part, burden-shifting analysis for Title 
VII disparate impact claims. 113 First, the plaintiffs must 
establish a prima facie case, showing that a challenged practice 
has an adverse impact on a minority group. 114 Once the 
plaintiffs have established a prima facie case, the burden shifts 
to the employer to show that the employment practice in 
question has a "manifest relationship to the employment"; 115 in 
other words, the employer has to show a "business 
justification."116 If the employer satisfies this requirement, the 
burden then shifts to the plaintiffs to establish that less 
discriminatory alternatives exist. 117 
111. Connecticut v. Teal. 157 U.S. 110, ·1fi:"i-56 (19H2) (quoting Griggs v. Dukt> 
Powl~r Co.,-101 U.S.121, ·1:n (1971)). 
112. A purposeful discrimination challenge~ could also lw made pursuant to thl' 
Equal Protection Clause. If plaintiffs could establish that purposeful discrimination 
has occm'!'ed, tlw cast> would lw nnalyzed under strict scrutiny. which is th(• most 
difficult Ievld of analysis for the government to overcom(,, If the plaintiffs can prOVl' 
racially discriminatory purpose fi>r value-addc'd designs or ratings. eitlwr through 
din~ct or circumstantial evidence, courts will not defer to thl' legislature. Such l'vidl'l1('(' 
could include "a cl(•ar pattern, ltn(•xplainable on grounds otht>r than ran•. !that] 
emerges fi·om the d'feet of the stat(• action ''vl'n when the governing l<•git-dation apJWars 
nt>utral on its face." Arlington Heights v. Metro. llous. Dcv. Corp., •129 U.S. 2:)2, 2GG 
(1977). Other evidcncl' of discriminatory purpose could come from th<• "historical 
background" of the enactment, design and/or use of tlw YAM. esjwcially "if' it l'<•veals a 
st>ril's of official actions taken for invidious pmpost>s." !d. at 2G7. HoWl'V<'r. it would bt> 
extremely difficult to find such (•vich,nce. See uencrally Arlington 1/eiuhts. •129 U.S.: 
Wa~hington v. Davis, 12fi U.S. 229 (197G) (highlighting the difficult nature of Equal 
Protection cases founded on racially discriminatory impact). Dut• to tlw difficulty in 
proving raci:1l animus and tlw fact that in current times govt>rnment officials art> less 
likely to leave a papl'r or electronic trail of such animus wlwn crafting policy or 
legislation, it would be bdter for plaintiffs to focus on disparate impact Title VII 
challenges since proof of discriminatory intent/purposl' is not requin,d. 
1J:i. See, c.f{., ,12 U.S.C. 2000t>-2(k) and Gulino v. N.Y. State• Educ. Dep't. 160 F.:ld 
:lfil, :m2 (2d Cir. 2006). 
111. Gulino. 1()0 F.:ld at :lll2. 
]]:), !d. 
116. /d. 
117. !d. In Wards Cow Packing Co. v. Atonio, ,190 U.S. G12. G59 (19H9). tlw 
Suprt>ml' Court ht>ld that in Tit](' VII disparate impaet. '"t.ht> ultimate burden of 
proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific 
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Plaintiffs should have no difficulty establishing a prima 
facie case of disparate impact. As noted above, black teachers 
receive lower value-added scores than white teachers in at 
least some existing publicly disclosed teacher effectiveness 
(V AM) reports. 11 )l Additionally, even though relatively small, 
there is a negative correlation between the number of black 
students a teacher has and the teacher's V AM scores, 119 and 
black teachers are more likely to work in majority-black 
schools. 12° Furthermore, with research showing that it is 
difficult to separate the effects of peer racial composition from 
teacher effects on student performance, the racially disparate 
impact of V AM cannot be trivialized. 121 
Assuming that black teachers are able to establish a prima 
facie case, the burden would then shift to the defendants to 
establish a business justification for the teachers' dismissal. 
The defendants would centrally argue as a business 
justification the need to ensure that ineffective teachers are not 
teaching students, for teacher quality determines student 
performance. However, the fact that value-added tests are 
riddled with error rate problems may make it difficult for the 
defendant state to establish such a manifest relationship. 
If the school district gets beyond the "business justification" 
hurdle, plaintiffs might suggest that a less racially 
discriminatory alternative would be to explicitly include 
indicators of the racial mix of students in the class as part of 
the teacher evaluation model. Doing so would hypothetically 
compare teachers of classrooms of children where racial 
composition of classrooms is statistically (albeit not practically) 
equalized. That is, teachers serving classrooms of 
predominantly black students would be compared against 
teachers serving classrooms of the same. In practice, many 
value-added models like the Los Angeles Times model avoid 
employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times."" (quoting Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1989) (emphasis in original)). In 1991, 
Congress responded to Wards Cove by codifying the disparate impact analysis prior to 
Wards Cove. 12 U.S.C. ~ 2000e-2(k)(l)(C) (2011). However, Congress failed to make 
similar changt~s to other employment discrimination statutes, such as the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 29 U.S.C. ~ 623 (2011). In Smith v. City of 
.Jackson, 511 U.S. 228, 240 (2005), the Court held that pre-Wards Cove analysis applies 
to ADEA claims. 
118. See Buddin, supra note 19. 
119. !d. 
120. Clotfelter et al., supra note 54, at :l77. 
121. Hanushek & Rivkin, supra note 4 7. 
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including race variables despite knowing their importance in 
resolving key modeling bias problems. While one can be 
reasonably sure that typical value-added models do not entirely 
mitigate racially disparate effects, even the most thorough 
value-added models cannot guarantee such results. 
V. RANDOMNESS: THE BITTERSWEET V AM PILL 
The previous section noted that VAM for teacher 
evaluations that rely 50%, or more on teacher scores may be 
subject to a variety of legal challenges. These challenges arise 
from the fact that V AM fails to adjust sufficiently for the 
differences in student populations. In order for YAM to work, it 
would be necessary to tackle the non-randomness problem in 
student assignments and teaching conditions. 122 For example, 
teachers might consider arguing for a "randomized student 
assignment clause" in their collective bargaining agreements 
("CBA") to require all students in any given grade level to be 
randomly assigned to classrooms and schools, stratified by 
student population characteristics including disabilities (by 
type), language proficiency, socio-economic status, and race. 
Teachers might also argue for more detailed "comparable 
conditions" clauses in their CBAs. These comparable conditions 
clauses would specify precisely the number of children to be 
taught per class or section and the numbers and types of 
children by various classifications (as per the random 
assignment system). Additionally, teachers could argue for 
comparable facilities, accommodations and other resources, 
including air quality, heating, cooling, lighting quality, 
materials, supplies, and equipment, and any other factors that 
may bias teacher "effectiveness" ratings. Furthermore, where 
teachers work in teams with students, requirements of rotating 
schedules to ensure a distribution of "time of day" for students 
in classes or sections might be considered. 
However, while randomized assignments would help 
address some of the concerns discussed in this article, the 
potential for unintended consequences exists. For instance, 
completely random assignment of students and random 
matching of students to teachers and classrooms removes the 
option for principals to work with teachers to determine the 
122. BAK 1m ET AL., supra nutt• 57. at ~J-11. 
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best match for each child and eliminates the possibility for 
teachers wishing to dedicate themselves to assisting more 
difficult children. Establishing comparison groups so that 
highly successful and predominantly white schools or districts 
must dismiss x percent of their teachers yearly simply to erase 
the racially disparate effect of dismissing x percent of teachers 
in poor minority districts based on their school- or district-level 
norms is equally absurd. 
Moreover, these proposed contractual solutions might only 
apply to a relatively small share of teachers in the system, 
given the fact that only about 20% of teachers can be linked 
directly to student performance measures in reading and 
math. 123 Additionally, in most studies of the stability of value-
added measures, math performance measures have been found 
much more stable than reading performance measures, and 
reading performance measures are much more strongly 
influenced by student learning outside the control of teachers 
over the summer. 124 As such, contracts for teachers evaluated 
via value-added measures must generally differ from those of 
other teachers, and it may be necessary to include different 
protections for teachers of reading than math to account for 
different levels of model error and different effects of student 
sorting based on differential summer learning patterns. For 
example, while fall-spring assessments are more appropriate 
than annual assessments for determining teacher effects in 
either reading or math, it would appear more important to 
include contractual requirements for fall-spring assessments 
for rating teachers of reading. 
The lack of randomness in student assignments that 
typifies V AM effectively ensures that the system will remain 
beset with other problems. The different pressures placed on 
teachers of reading and math between grades three and eight 
and other teacher specialists working with the same students 
may create unintended curricular consequences. For instance, 
a core-content-area teacher might refuse release time for those 
students that would most help that teacher improve her value-
added ratings while encouraging release time or classroom 
removal for more disruptive students that might negatively 
12:3. See supra Part Ill.F, pointing out that standardized assessments currently 
used mostly focus on language arts or reading and math performance between grades 
three and eight. 
124. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., supra note 29. 
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impact her ratings. Furthermore, re-assignment of teachers 
into and out of value-added-rated contractual categories, 
including moving a teacher from second grade (not rated) to 
third or fourth, may become much more cumbersome and even 
lead to illicit backroom deals between teachers and 
administrators as teachers seek to avoid falling into value-
added-rated categories. This could severely compromise the 
integrity of the educational process and, indeed, student 
achievement. Perhaps the least reasonable solution is simply to 
test everything from kindergarten art work to the high school 
jazz ensemble's performance in order to apply value-added 
ratings to teachers responsible for each aspect of student work 
as they pass through the school system. While seemingly 
absurd, states including Tennessee have established 
committees to explore this and other equally problematic 
possibilities, including the evaluation of teachers in music and 
art according to school average achievement growth in tested 
subject areas or of counselors by student discipline referral 
rates. 125 Alternatively, schools might simply choose to 
discontinue offering anything that is not presently tested. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In response to complaints about teacher evaluation 
programs, several states have adopted VAM policies. Three 
states have gone so far as to base 50%) of their teacher 
evaluation policies on VAM. This Article advises against such 
reliance on YAM because of the attendant technical and legal 
problems. Random assignments provide the best possible 
avenue for alleviating some of the problems identified, but even 
then only as a bittersweet pill given the potential unintended 
consequences. Unless randomness can be incorporated into 
YAM models, the basic notion of fairness demands that states 
refrain from relying on a flawed model with such high error 
rates in determining the fate of their teachers. A 25<)1) chance of 
error is not acceptable, while a 35% chance of erroneous 
deprivation is unconscionable. Since VAM is in its incipiency, 
states still have an opportunity to incorporate the above 
suggestions to make the system fair and less susceptible to 
125. Tennessee Teacher l~ualuation Aduisory Committee. TN.Cov. 
ht.tp://www.tn.govil~ducation/TEAC.shtml (last visited .Jan. 20, 2012) (SPl' nweting 
minutl~s for details of options considen,d). 
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challenges, for, as noted author Orlando A. Battista once 
stated, "[a]n error doesn't become a mistake until you refuse to 
correct it." 126 
126. QuoteH by Orlando A. Battista, QUOTF:WORLD .ORG, 
http://www.quoteworld.org/authors/orlando_a_hattista (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
